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Abstract 
 
Alzheimer’s disease is a degenerative disease of the brain that impairs mental skills and 
abilities and undermines independent living. It is estimated to affect over 44 million people 
worldwide, and 5.3 million in the US at an estimated cost of $226 billion. The numbers of 
people affected are expected to increase dramatically over the next few decades along with 
increased life expectancy, and costs are expected to be over $1 trillion by 2050. There is 
currently no cure, and accurate diagnosis in primary care is hampered by a lack of widely 
available, reliable, and specific forms of assessment. Accurate diagnosis is essential to avoid 
inappropriate and expensive clinical follow-up, to evaluate new treatments when these 
become available, to avoid underestimating or overestimating prevalence of the disease, and 
to inform policy priorities on resource allocation for health care and for research. We argue 
that the cognitive and behavioral sciences offer an important route to developing widely 
available, inexpensive, reliable and specific assessment tools for the disease.
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What is Alzheimer’s Disease and why is it a policy issue? 
 
Alzheimer’s Disease (AD) is the most frequent form of dementia that occurs mainly, but not 
exclusively, in older adults. It is a degenerative disease of the brain that affects mental skills 
and abilities, in particular memory function, as well as behavior, emotion and personality. As 
the disease progresses, it presents significant challenges for independent living, placing a 
major burden on families and the healthcare system. With increased life expectancy across 
the population comes an increased number of people suffering from the disease. In 2013, an 
estimated 44.35 million people were living with dementia worldwide, predicted to be 75.62 
million by 2030, and 135.46 million by 2050 (Alzheimer's Disease International, Policy Brief 
for Heads of Government: The Global Impact of Dementia 2013-2050. 
http://www.alz.co.uk). Currently, in the US, an estimated 5.3 million people have AD, most 
of whom are over 65. In 2015, AD costs to US society are estimated to total $226 billion. 
These costs are shared almost equally between Medicare and individual families, and are 
expected to soar to over $1.1 trillion by 2050 (US Alzheimer’s Association, 
http://www.alz.org/).  
 
Addressing the current and future massive personal, societal and financial burdens of AD 
raises a wide range of major policy issues. These include how to set priorities within political 
agendas, how to support families and individuals affected at home and in the workplace, and 
how projected costs may be met. Equally important are questions about how to facilitate the 
development of treatments, and how to develop accurate and reliable assessments for 
diagnosis and for evaluations of the effectiveness of proposed treatments. This last issue 
might sometimes be seen as less salient when setting policy priorities. However, accurate and 
reliable assessment of AD is crucial to avoid (a) under-estimating or over-estimating its 
prevalence in society, (b) the serious consequences of misdiagnosis and inappropriate 
treatment, and (c) the adoption and costs of proposed treatments that in reality fail to offer the 
claims for prevention or slowing of disease progression. In this article we discuss examples 
of how the behavioral and cognitive sciences can inform policy by generating evidence-based 
assessments that are inexpensive as well as accurate and reliable as aids to AD diagnosis.  
 
The Challenges for Clinical Practice and Policy 
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The challenges presented by AD are exacerbated by the lack of a cure and by the fact that 
there is no widely available gold standard for diagnosis. Considerable resources are being 
directed towards developing possible treatments. However, assessing the effectiveness of 
such treatments requires accurate diagnosis when selecting participants for clinical trials, and 
reliable measures of changes in the severity of the disease. These requirements help ensure 
that any observed slowing of the progression of AD, or an improvement in the condition can 
be detected and confidently attributed to the treatment, rather than resulting from mistaken 
inclusion of participants who do not have the disease, or a problem with the reliability or 
accuracy of the measures. Should such a treatment generate strong evidence of effectiveness, 
then it is likely to be more successful if started at an early stage of the disease. This would 
require early diagnosis and a means for assessment of the progression of the disease over 
time. Moreover, the diagnostic criteria have to be specific for AD, the symptoms of which are 
similar to those of other forms of dementia, similar to chronic depression, and similar to some 
features of normal aging. Early diagnosis also helps to inform families while the individual 
with AD still has the mental capacity to be involved in the planning and organization of their 
care. Misdiagnosis can lead to unnecessary concern or misleading reassurance, incorrect 
treatments, and possibly unnecessary referral for expensive analysis of spinal fluid samples or 
brain scans.  
 
A note of caution is that diagnosing the disease many years in advance of its development 
may not be welcomed given implications for health insurance. Moreover, the wide 
availability of such advance knowledge across the population might lead to unnecessary high 
levels of personal or public expenditure on new products that are marketed as helping to 
prevent the onset or progression of the disease, but with little or no supportive evidence as to 
the claimed benefits. While medical science and healthcare policy would be helped by  
identification of factors that could predict development of AD several decades in the future, 
many individuals and families might simply prefer not to know until the early symptoms of 
the disease begin to emerge (e.g., Mattsson, Brax & Zetterberg, 2010). However, when 
symptoms such as worrying memory failures begin to appear, then linking the onset of those 
symptoms unambiguously with a specific disease would most likely be welcomed by 
individuals, families and health professionals alike. 
 
Individuals who go on to develop AD typically seek initial help in primary care when they or 
a close friend or family member notice unusual errors in their behavior, thinking, language or 
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memory (e.g., Smith, Della Sala, Logie & Maylor, 2000). Currently, diagnosis of AD is based 
on a clinician taking a medical history, carrying out a physical examination, and taking blood 
samples or referring the patient for a brain scan (if facilities are available) in order to rule out 
other possible causes of the symptoms such as a vitamin deficiency, infection, or brain 
tumour. In the absence of an alternative diagnosis, the patient might be referred to a memory 
or geriatric clinic for further assessment. Therefore, initial assessment is based on excluding 
other possible causes. The diagnosis of possible AD is then based on assessment of mental 
status using cognitive markers, together with biological markers from body fluid analysis or 
brain scans if these are available or affordable. 
 
Biological and cognitive markers of AD 
Biological markers or ‘biomarkers’ for AD include analysis of a sample of fluid taken from 
the spine and analysis of brain scans. These biomarker tests have been shown to be sensitive 
and specific for Alzheimer’s disease, although they are not fully reliable and have not been 
wholly satisfactory in differentiating AD from other forms of dementia (e.g., Blennow, 
Dubois, Fagan, Lewczuk, de Leon & Hampel, 2015; Frisoni et al., 2010; Johnson, Fox, 
Sperling & Klunk, 2012; Swan, Waddell, Holloway, Bak, Colville, Khan & Pal, 2015). There 
is a substantial research effort directed towards refining the use of such biomarkers, which 
are viewed as the best forms of assessment available. As such, clinical policy views 
biomarkers as a form of ‘gold standard’ for assessment of AD. However, these techniques 
can be invasive, painful (e.g. a needle in the spine) and/or expensive (brain imaging). 
Moreover, they are only available in specialist centers and hospitals with highly trained staff. 
This means that they are not widely available, and the cost of setting up and running the 
necessary facilities, coupled with the very large volume of older people who seek medical 
help for their memory problems make current biomarkers an impractical solution for routine 
assessment. Hence, clinical policy and practice cannot rely on current biomarkers. Moreover, 
due to their still limited specificity, biomarkers are currently recommended as research tools 
only rather than for routine clinical use (Sperling & Johnson, 2013).  
 
Assessments of Mental or Cognitive Functions 
Typically, diagnosis and monitoring of progression of AD is assisted by the use of generic 
assessments of ‘cognitive’ functions, namely memory, learning, attention, perception, 
thinking and language. These assessments are non-invasive, inexpensive, portable and, unlike 
assessment of spinal fluid samples and brain scans, they are widely available in clinical 
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settings and can be used in primary care with minimal waiting time for the testing or for 
receiving the results. The outcome of this clinical assessment is often used to refer the patient 
to a specialist or for further assessment, such as a brain scan when the facilities are available 
and affordable. Or they may assist in the diagnosis of conditions such as depression that can 
be treated, at least initially, in primary care. However, cognitive assessments in current 
clinical use can only detect that there is a general impairment in mental ability. They cannot 
identify the underlying cause of that impairment. Therefore, these assessments may lead to 
uncertain diagnosis, or inappropriate clinical follow-up.  
 
Tests of cognitive function also have a range of other limitations. The most frequently used 
forms of assessment are dementia severity scales, notably the Mini-Mental State Examination 
(MMSE - Folstein, Folstein & McHugh, 1975). This can be a useful tool to categorise 
patients according to how severe is their general cognitive impairment, but it has been known 
for some time that it is not reliable (e.g., Cossa, Della Sala, Musicco, Spinnler & Ubezio, 
1997), nor is it specific for AD (e.g., Boustani, Peterson, Hanson, Harris & Lohr, 2003; Tariq, 
Tumosa, Chibnall, Perry, & Morley, 2006) and has poor sensitivity for detecting impairments 
in individuals with high levels of education (Vertesi, Lever, Molloy, Sanderson, Tuttle et al., 
2001). Other dementia severity scales such as the Milan Overall Dementia Assessment 
(Brazzelli, Capitani, Della Sala, Spinnler, & Zuffi, 1994), and the Addenbrooke’s Cognitive 
Examination (e.g., Hsieh, Schubert, Hoon, Mioshi & Hodges, 2013), have been shown to be 
more reliable and sensitive. However, poor performance on these collections of short tests is 
not an indicator of any particular disease. 
 
More extensive batteries of tests assessing cognitive functions are also available, notably 
ADAS-Cog or CANTAB. These are commonly used in aiding diagnosis as well as in clinical 
trials of pharmaceutical treatments for AD. ADAS-Cog (Rosen, Mohs, & Davis, 1984) is 
widely used in the US and consists of 11 tests covering a range of cognitive functions, not 
just those affected specifically by AD. However, it has been shown to suffer from 
unreliability and a lack of sensitivity (e.g., Connor & Sabbagh, 2008; Karin, Hannesdottir, 
Jaeger, Annas, Segerdahl, Karlsson, Sjörgen, Rosen & Miller, 2014). CANTAB (e.g., 
Sahakian & Owen, 1992) is one of the best-known test batteries for cognitive impairment in 
the UK. This also is a suite of tests to measure a wide range of cognitive functions that offers 
a profile of which cognitive abilities are impaired and which are relatively spared in 
individuals. It is continually under development with an ongoing research program, but its 
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strength lies in detecting that impairments are present, not what is causing those impairments, 
and so it is not specific for AD. It involves extended time for testing each patient, and 
performance on the tests is affected by healthy aging. It is also expensive relative to other 
forms of cognitive testing. 
 
These test batteries were developed in the 1980s and 1990s, when theories of human mental 
abilities were much more preliminary than they are now, and the batteries involve multiple 
different tests that require extensive training to administer and score. The test batteries were 
also developed when there was limited understanding of the link between specific cognitive 
abilities and specific structures and networks in the brain that become less efficient with 
healthy aging, or fail to function as a result of specific brain diseases or brain injury. These 
widely used test batteries may be useful in measuring the severity of the cognitive 
impairment and in identifying the kinds of abilities that are impaired or are spared in a given 
individual. This information could be extremely helpful when advising individuals and their 
carers about the possible effect of cognitive impairments on everyday life. However, they are 
limited as aids to diagnosing the underlying cause of those impairments, and as such they are 
not effective aids to identifying that the individual is suffering from AD rather than showing 
the signs of healthy aging, or other disorders such as chronic depression or other forms of 
dementia. 
  
There is widespread consensus that the main clinical criterion for referring a patient for 
further diagnostic tests is the presence of memory problems. Indeed, the hallmark of AD is 
widely considered to be a deficit in memory (Dubois, Feldman, Jacova, DeKosky, Barberger-
Gateau et al., 2007; Perry, Watson & Hodges, 2000), and memory problems are well 
established as being associated with, and being very sensitive to the early stages of the 
disease. Unfortunately memory problems also occur in many other disorders, including 
depression, and even in healthy normal aging, leading to diagnostic uncertainty (e.g., Pfennig, 
Littmann & Bauer, 2007; Wright and Persaud, 2007). Moreover, the early sensitivity to AD 
of memory tests is coupled with performance that becomes too poor after the disease has 
progressed to allow for reliable or repeated measurement (e.g., Frisoni, Ghiretti, Catricala, 
Pomati, Marcone et al., 2010) to track the progression of the disease or evaluate efficacy of 
treatment. On the other hand, in less severe patients and in healthy volunteers, many memory 
tests tend to show effects of improvement simply due to practice across repeated test sessions 
(e.g., Rabbitt, Diggle, Holland & McKinnes, 2004). This practice effect could mistakenly be 
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interpreted as a benefit from a treatment (see discussion in Foley, Cocchini, Logie, & Della 
Sala, 2015). People who show early signs of memory deterioration do not necessarily go on 
to develop AD, and AD is not an inevitable consequence of aging: more than 50% of people 
who live into their 80s and 90s do not develop the disease, even if they show a decline in 
memory ability for other reasons. So, memory tests are sensitive but they are not specific to 
the disease. Indeed, there may be a danger of over-diagnosing dementia in patients who suffer 
from other disorders, including chronic depression, that have similar symptoms such as 
memory loss. Such over-diagnosis has implications for healthcare costs of inappropriate 
assessments and inappropriate treatments, and implications for the everyday lives and 
concerns of individuals and their families (Le Couteur, Doust, Creasey & Brayne, 2013). We 
would argue then that one reason that cognitive assessments are seen by clinical policy 
makers as less promising than biomarkers as a means to help diagnose the disease is because 
biomarkers are typically designed to be specific to particular disorders and in many cases 
have been demonstrated to be so. Cognitive assessments typically are designed to be sensitive 
to the presence of a disorder, not to identify what that disorder might be. Therefore, even if 
they are much less expensive and more practical for large numbers of people, traditional tests 
of memory are not ideal for developing AD-specific assessments. More recent evidence from 
the cognitive and behavioral sciences has pointed towards approaches that might combine the 
convenience, sensitivity, and low cost of cognitive assessments with much greater specificity 
for the disease.  
 
AD-Specific Cognitive Markers 
In summary, the ideal cognitive test for aiding the diagnosis of AD should: 
 Not show effects of healthy ageing 
 Be sensitive and specific to the very early stages of AD 
 Not show improvement solely as a result of repeated testing 
 Be useable in Primary Care and in intervention trials with minimal training for 
administration and scoring 
 Avoid very low performance levels when the symptoms become severe 
 Be targeted at cognitive impairments shown in AD but not in other disorders 
 Be non-invasive with minimal discomfort to the patient 
 Be quick to administer and inexpensive 
 Be insensitive to the cultural background and literacy levels of those assessed 
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 Be able to identify impairments in daily living 
 
Finally, tests of impairments in mental abilities are likely to be more specific to particular 
disorders if they arise from scientific theories validated from empirical evidence of human 
mental ability and the links between different mental abilities and structures and networks in 
the brain that are damaged by those disorders. Over the last two decades, there has been a 
substantial accumulation of scientific evidence that has allowed the development of such 
validated theories. These advances have led to the design of cognitive tests that go a long way 
to meeting the above criteria for AD-specific cognitive markers. 
 
Free and Cued Selective Reminding test 
One cognitive test that has been proposed as a candidate for a specific cognitive marker for 
AD, is the Free and Cued Selective Reminding test (FCSRT) (Grober, Buschke, Crystal, 
Bang, & Dresner, 1988; Dubois, Feldman, Jacova, Cummings, DeKosky et al., 2010). This is 
a memory test that typically involves first presenting a set of items that participants are then 
required to recall, first with no cues given, and then in response to specific cues for each item 
that they had previously failed to recall. The use of the cue procedure is a key characteristic 
that is not present in traditional memory tests. A consensus conference (Dubois et al., 2007) 
argued that a version of this task involving memory for arrays of presented pictures of 
objects, has high predictive value for the progression towards AD. For example, in a study by 
Sarazin, Chauvire, Gerardin, Colliot, Kinkingnehun et al. (2007), 251 participants considered 
at risk of developing dementia were tested initially and followed at six-month intervals for up 
to three years. A total of 59 of them developed AD. Out of the tests that were included in that 
study, the most sensitive and specific for diagnosis of early AD was the FCSRT. However, it 
remains unclear if the test would meet all of the criteria mentioned above. In particular, a 
well-established literature has shown that the FCSRT is affected by healthy ageing (e.g. 
Grober, Hall, Lipton, Zonderman, Resnick et al., 2008; Grober, Lipton, Katz, & Sliwinski, 
1998), and it is unknown as to whether or not performance is affected by repeated testing. 
Thus, poor performance in FCSRT may not offer the best indicator of AD (Carlesimo, Perri, 
& Caltagirone, 2011; Gainotti, Quaranta, Vita, & Marra, 2014). 
 
Temporary Memory Binding 
An alternative approach to the development of cognitive markers has come from clinical and 
experimental evidence showing that patients in the early stages of AD have problems dealing 
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with multiple sources of information (e.g., Della Sala, Foley, Parra & Logie, 2011; Foley et 
al., 2015; Logie, Cocchini, Della Sala, & Baddeley, 2004). A specific form of this on-line 
cognitive processing is known as temporary binding. This refers to the processes by which 
different aspects of stimuli such as colors and shapes are bound together on a temporary basis 
as an integrated object (i.e., a colored shape) (Allen, Baddeley & Hitch, 2006; Logie, 
Brockmole & Vandenbroucke, 2009; Luck & Vogel, 1997, Treisman 2006). To perform this 
kind of task, it is essential to keep track of the rapid changes in the environment such as the 
colors and types of cars about to overtake us on the freeway, or whether we have just taken 
the yellow oval pill or the white oval pill, or who said what during a conversation. People 
have to keep track of continually changing temporary bindings in their daily lives, so a 
breakdown in the ability to do so can undermine independent living. Holding and updating 
these rapid changes around us is thought to be a function of a system in the brain known as 
working memory (Baddeley, 2007; Baddeley & Logie, 1999; Logie, 2011) that can hold 
information for a few seconds and continually update its contents to help us reason, think, 
solve problems, navigate, hold conversations and generally interact with the world moment to 
moment.  
 
Holding color-shape combinations for just a few seconds is very different from learning 
stable associations that are a function of long term memory, such as an object and its location, 
a face with a name, or that the typical receptacle for mail in the UK is red and cylindrical, but 
in the US is blue and rectangular with a rounded top. Evidence suggests that temporary 
binding and the learning of associations are each supported by a different memory process 
(Colzato, Raffone & Hommel, 2006; Logie et al. 2009; Parra, Della Sala, Logie & Morcom, 
2014; Parra, Fabi, Luzzi, Cubelli, Hernandez et al., 2013; Treisman 2006) and are 
differentially affected by brain damage and aging (Parra, Abrahams, Fabi, Logie, Luzzi et al., 
2009a; Parra, Della Sala, Logie, & Abrahams, 2009b). 
  
It has been demonstrated repeatedly that the learning of associations between stimuli  
(including objects and colors, word pairs, or patterns and spatial location) is affected in AD 
(e.g., Buschke et al., 1999; Fowler, Saling, Conway, Semple & Louis, 2002; Gallo, Sullivan, 
Daffner, Schacter & Budson, 2004). This associative learning has been shown to be 
dependent on a specific area of the brain known as the hippocampus in the temporal lobe (see 
Figure 1) and damage to this region is thought to be the hallmark of AD (e.g., Lowndes & 
Savage, 2007). However, associative learning (and hippocampal function) also declines as 
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part of the normal aging process (de Jager, Blackwell, Budge & Sahakian, 2005; De Jager, 
Milwain & Budge, 2002; Old & Naveh-Benjamin, 2008) and in other disorders common in 
older adults namely chronic depression (Gainotti, Marra, Villa, Parlato & Charotti, 1998; 
Fossati et al., 2004; Kaschel, Logie, Kazén,  & Della Sala, 2009). The lack of specificity of 
this deficit limits the use of associative learning tasks in the assessment and diagnosis of AD. 
 
Figure 1. The major lobes of the cerebral cortex of the human brain. 
 
 
Figure 2. Test for temporary memory of two shapes, of two colors, or of two colored shapes. Participants decide 
if the memory probe matches their memory for the display that they saw 900 milliseconds previously. They 
would be given multiple trials with different shapes, colors, or colored shapes on each trial. On half of the 
occasions there is a match, and on the other half of the occasions they do not match, as shown here. 
 
 
In a series of studies we have demonstrated that poor performance on tests of temporary 
binding is indicative of the very early stages of AD. Crucially, unlike other tests, impairments 
in temporary binding appear to be specific to the disease. We have developed a range of tasks 
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to measure this function through the temporary retention of shapes and colors. The tasks 
enable the comparison of memory for single features (shapes or objects) and combinations of 
bound features (colored objects). A typical task is illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
We demonstrated a selective temporary binding deficit in a group of individuals with AD in 
comparison to healthy age-matched older adults (Parra et al. 2009a). The AD group showed a 
disproportionate deficit in the temporary retention of colored shapes in comparison to 
memory for a color alone or a shape alone. Remarkably, this selective temporary binding 
deficit was also present in people with a genetic mutation that invariably leads to early-onset 
AD (age around 45-50 years), but who were tested at age 30-35 years, that is ten years or 
more before they were showing symptoms of the disease (Parra et al. 2010. The task 
combined more sensitivity and specificity for AD than either associative learning tasks or 
other standard memory tasks. The task has the added advantage that, because of its reliance 
on simple shapes and colors, it can be used with people who have impaired language. 
Moreover, it is not affected by repeated testing (Logie et al, 2009), or by the level of 
education (Parra et al., 2010), so it can be used to test people with low levels of literacy as 
well as to test people who are highly educated. 
 
Temporary binding impairments have also been shown to be specific to AD. This binding 
ability is preserved in healthy older adults who show no difference in memory ability for 
bindings between colors and shapes compared with memory for colors alone or shapes alone. 
(Parra et al. 2009a, b). This contrasts with associative learning that is vulnerable to the effects 
of age (e.g., Old and Naveh-Benjamin, 2008). Moreover, we have shown that the task also 
differentiates between AD and chronic depression as well as between AD and healthy aging 
(Parra et al. 2010). Depression is common in older adults, and poor performance on standard 
memory tests is characteristic of both AD and depression. We demonstrated that only the AD 
patients performed poorly on the shape-colour binding condition, whereas people with 
depression and healthy older people showed no difference between remembering single 
features (colors or shapes) and temporary bindings of features (colored shapes). Moreover 
our most recent work has demonstrated that this temporary binding deficit was not present in 
other forms of dementia, highlighting that it is specific to AD. Individuals with Vascular 
Dementia, Lewy Body Dementia, Frontal Lobe Dementia, and Dementia associated with 
Parkinson’s Disease showed a profile of impairment in memory, attention, executive 
dysfunction and visuospatial dysfunction on standard neuropsychological testing (Della Sala, 
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Parra, Fabi, Luzzi, & Abrahams, 2011). However, as shown in Figure 3, only those with AD 
showed a specific temporary memory binding deficit compared with memory for single 
features.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. A deficit in temporary binding is shown for AD but not in healthy older people (Controls) or in other 
forms of dementia. FTD-Frontotemporal dementia. PD-Parkinson’s Disease. VasD-Vascular Dementia. DLB-
Lewy Body Dementia 
 
Neuroanatomy of Temporary Binding 
Cerebral changes very early in the course of AD are selective. Analyses of structural brain 
scans using Magnetic Resonance Imaging (e.g., Busatto et al., 2003) have shown shrinking of 
the brain in specific areas (known as focal brain atrophy), mainly in the medial and lateral 
temporal lobe regions. Figure 4 shows a scan of a healthy brain on the left, and of a brain 
with temporal lobe atrophy, including the hippocampus, on the right. The brain atrophy then 
spreads to other areas of the brain. However, it is not the only brain damage characteristic of 
AD.  
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Figure 4. A scan of a healthy brain (left) and of a brain with focal atrophy (darker areas). particularly the medial 
temporal lobe, including the hippocampus. 
 
The different areas of the brain normally communicate with one another via a network of 
connections known as white matter tracts; in the course of AD such connections become 
progressively thinner and more inefficient particularly between the front (or anterior) and the 
back (posterior) areas of the brain (e.g., Bokde, Ewers & Hampel, 2009). Colors and shapes 
are known to be processed by different areas of the brain (Van Essen & Drury, 1997), and 
binding colors and shapes together requires communication and integration between those 
areas (O'Reilly, Busby, & Soto, 2003). Therefore one plausible hypothesis as to why 
temporary binding shows a specific deficit in AD is because it is dependent on the integrity of 
communication along these white matter tracts (Parra et al., 2015). 
 
As mentioned above, the hippocampus is well known to be crucial for memory and learning, 
and to be one of the structures affected first by the brain atrophy that accompanies AD (Braak 
& Braak, 1991). Due to its prominent role in learning and memory, and to the observation 
that the earliest symptoms referred to by patients with AD appear to reflect memory 
impairment, most memory tests developed to date have aimed at tests of the efficiency of the 
hippocampus (Schobel, Buxton, Witter, & Barnes, 2011). However, focusing too much on the 
assessment of hippocampal-related memory may delay the diagnosis of AD (see Sperling et 
al., 2001). In particular, the hippocampus undergoes significant structural and functional 
changes as people grow older whether or not they will develop AD (Yang, Goh, Chen, & 
Qiu, 2013). This overlap with changes in healthy aging prevents the early identification of 
deficits specific to AD, even with highly validated tests. Nevertheless, recent guidelines 
continue to emphasize tests of associative learning and memory functions as promising 
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markers for the early detection of AD (Auriacombe et al., 2010; Dubois et al., 2010; Dubois 
et al., 2007).  
 
More recently, it has been suggested that memory tasks that target the stages of AD that occur 
prior to major changes in the hippocampus may be more promising in supporting early 
detection of the disease, than those that target the hippocampal stages (Didic et al., 2011; Das 
et al., 2015; Wolk, Mancuso, Kliot, Arnold, & Dickerson, 2013; Stark, Yassa, Lacy, & Stark, 
2013). Before affecting the hippocampus, AD brain pathology seems to impact on other 
regions that are close to the hippocampus (extra-hippocampal regions), known as the 
entorhinal and perirhinal cortex (Braak, Braak, & Bohl, 1993; Juottonen et al., 1998). 
Although this evidence is not entirely new, the role of these regions in supporting memory 
and development of cognitive tasks that are suitable to assess their function have become 
clear only over the last decade (Mayes, Montaldi, & Migo, 2007; Montaldi, Spencer, Roberts, 
& Mayes, 2006). The hippocampus supports learning for associative memory such as 
remembering details about an object or person encountered before. In contrast, the extra-
hippocampal regions appear to support memory for more arbitrary memories for information 
not explicitly associated with particular details, such as recognizing something as familiar but 
not remembering where or when it has been encountered. The arbitrary combination of color 
and shape in temporary binding, shown to be sensitive and specific to AD, would also be an 
example of this latter form of memory. There is now evidence supporting the notion that 
associations in memory are different from more arbitrary memory for something being 
familiar. We will consider three lines of evidence for this difference. 
 
First, studies using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scans of the brains of 
healthy young volunteers have revealed that a temporary memory binding task does not rely 
on the function of the hippocampus. This task activates a network involving specific regions 
of the brain but not including the hippocampus (Parra, Della Sala, Logie, & Morcom, 2014). 
This evidence converges with previous fMRI studies which also assessed similar forms of 
temporary binding (Xu, 2007; Song & Jiang, 2006; Shafritz, Gore, & Marois, 2002). When 
more associative information becomes relevant (e.g. the location of an object), the 
involvement of the hippocampus becomes apparent (Piekema, Rijpkema, Fernandez, & 
Kessels, 2010).  
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A second source of evidence for the difference in memory types comes from studies of 
individual cases of people with specific and focused brain lesions. One individual known by 
the initials AE (Parra et al., 2013), suffered from a stroke resulting in damage to the right 
hippocampus. The person had a striking deficit in associative binding, but had completely 
preserved temporary binding. Preserved temporary binding ability but impaired associative  
binding in the presence of damage to the hippocampus has also been observed in an 
individual known as Jon (Baddeley, Allen, & Vargha-Khadem, 2010).  
 
A third source of evidence comes from studies, mentioned earlier, of groups of individuals 
who have a genetic mutation that is known to result in the development of AD when they are 
in their late 40s. Genetic testing can identify these individuals many years before they show 
any cognitive or other impairments associated with the disease, for example when they are 
between 30 and 40 years of age. Despite showing no evidence of impairments on standard 
memory and other cognitive tests, these individuals perform poorly on temporary binding 
tests, specifically temporary binding of color and shape. However, they show normal levels of 
performance on associative binding tests, such as learning pairs of words (Parra et al., 2011; 
Parra et al., 2010).  
 
In sum, this neuroanatomical evidence supports the recent proposal that temporary binding 
tasks that appear to require the use of extra-hippocampal regions in the brain may be more 
promising for the early detection of AD than traditional memory tasks that rely heavily on 
intact functioning of the hippocampus. This novel evidence may help explain why the 
temporary memory binding task has proved insensitive to healthy ageing. In contrast to the 
hippocampus that shrinks as we grow older, brain regions along the lower areas of the brain, 
known as the ventral stream, such as the fusiform gyrus, enthorinal cortex and ventral 
prefrontal cortex seem to undergo functional reorganization with age and allow the 
maintenance of performance on temporary binding tasks (Grady & Craik, 2000). Moreover, 
because temporary binding of color and shape does not rely on former associations, nor does 
it lead to learning or require support from previous knowledge, it is not influenced by 
repeated exposures (Logie et al., 2009; Colzato et al., 2006) or the cultural background or 
educational level of the assessed individual (Parra et al., 2011). 
  
Conclusions for research, clinical practice and policy 
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Neuropsychological assessment plays a vital role in the diagnosis of dementia. Although it is 
recognized that memory changes are a primary feature of AD, diagnosis is often difficult 
because several disorders that are common in older adults (including cerebrovascular disease, 
depression, other types of dementia) and even healthy aging, also manifest with memory 
dysfunction. The identification of a sensitive and specific cognitive marker of AD will 
ultimately aid in differential diagnosis and early detection of the disease. Accurate and early 
diagnosis will ensure that appropriate drug interventions are administered, will aid in tailored 
care plans being implemented at a timely stage, and will ensure correct classification of 
patients for appropriate placement within clinical trials. Improving early diagnosis and care 
of patients with dementia is a current primary target for the National Institutes of Health in 
the US and for the National Health Service within the UK, and will no doubt continue to be a 
national and international priority.  
 
To date the findings suggest that temporary binding may be a promising tool to help 
differentiate AD from other dementias and from disorders common in older adults including 
chronic depression. It has the advantage of being based on solid behavioral, cognitive, and 
neuroanatomical evidence, and offers an example of how such evidence might help drive 
future policy and clinical practice in combining the advantage of both cognitive and 
biomarkers in the diagnosis of AD. More broadly, it serves as an example of how scientific 
developments in the behavioral and cognitive neuroscience can inform clinical approaches 
and evidence-based policies to address major health challenges.  
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